The Loan Sale Market and the Financial Deregulation by Fukaura Atsuyuki
55




The loan sale markets are classified into two types. The one is the "positive" market, which im-
proves the efficiency or economizes the transaction cost accompanied with all financial in-
termediation and the other is "negative" one. The introduction of the loan sale market is an impor-
tant step from the regulation-oriented financial system to the market-oriented one and we believe
no doubt that accelerates the speed of financial liberalizations and replaces the regulatory factors
to the market based ones. Logically discussing, the loan market is closely related to the free issu-
ing system. In this sense, we can derive some lessons from the free banking era.
I Introduction
Japanese economy is currently locked in a vicious deflationary circle, with chronic finan-
cial instability at it's center. In spite of the gigantic stimulus package of 14 trillion yen, the
unemployment rate has been historically high, the growth rate of national income has been low
and the stock price has been depressed. The situation has not been restored even in 1995. The
financial system has also been facing severe turbulence due to the adverse macroeconomics
shocks. Falling land and stock price have more weakened such a situation.
Japanese financial authorities (Bank of Japan, Ministry of Finance) dose not intend to
remove the "too big to fail" principle, which symbolizes the regulation-oriented banking policy,
at least through 2000. As the results, a large discussion on the rescue program for failing banks
raised from the all angles. Unfortunately, under such a confusing situation, the public con-
fidences to the whole banking system and financial authorities was further harmed. As the
public has been recognizing the inability of the traditional fiscal and monetary policy, the
regulation-oriented system has been challenging and changing drastically without the explicit
authorized guidance.
*The first version of this study was presented at the annual meeting of Monetary Economics Association in May,
1995 and revised during my staying at School of Financial Studies &Law in Sheffield Hallam University. I must
deeply appreciate to Prof. Kevin Dowd , Lecturer Teng Zhongquin, Miss.Hisami Tsurumori for helpful discus-
sions and suggestions. Further, I expand my special thanks to all other administrative, technical staffs in SHU
who helped my research activities in every respects.
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The introduction of the 10an sa1e market is the examp1e in the financia1 fie1d. This 
market was originally emerged in U.S.A. to liquidate the 10ng term housing 10an main1y and 
then exported to many other countries. In recent ]apan， the growth of this market is spon-
taneous one which is aimed to react the BIS regu1ation or some governmenta1 regu1ation on 
bank' s ba1ance sheet or the business district. 
However， unfortunate1y after 1991 in ]apan， the 10an sa1e is regarded as the emergency 
evacuation for quasi-failed financia1 institutions which inc1ude the commercia1 banks and some 
specialized financia1 institutions (the housing 10an campanies， Jutaku senmon kinうIUkasiya， 
Jusen in short). In our view， this kind of 10an sa1e must be c1assified to "negative" market and 
the one which improves the efficiency or economizes the transaction cost accompanied with al 
financia1 intermediation is “positive". In princip1e， however， we can eva1uate these movement 
positive1y as an important step from the regu1ation-oriented financia1 system to the market-
oriented one and we believe no doubt that acce1erates the speed of financia1 liberalizations 
(deregu1ation) and rep1aces the regu1atory factors to the market based ones. In this paper， by 
focusing the implications of the 10an sa1e market， we consider the future shape of the banking 
system 1). 
I The informational aspect of the loan sale market 
I -1 The classification of the loan market 
Before discussing the tit1ed issue， we must consider the fundamenta1 features of the 10an 
sa1e market. In our view， the 10an sa1e market has two basic functions as follows， 
a. to improve an efficiency by reducing the transaction cost any financia1 intermediaries 
must suffer. 
b. to improve an efficiency by removing the bad performed financia1 activities. 
The former corresponds to“positive九narketand the other to“negative". We will discuss these 
in turn. 
(1) the positive market 
In genera1， the financia1 intermediation is formed from two activities， one is to raise 
funds and the other is to use funds. Need1ess to say， they require the different financia1 skil， 
a1though they are c1ose1y re1ated. From the view points of the economics， the term of“different 
1) The rapid development of the information processing and telecommunication technique must be necessary. 
On this point we can be optimistic. For exampie， by the introduction of the digital communication technique， the 
channel of the communications satelites are drastica11y increased which brings the opportunities for entry to 
the communication business. The financia1 technolongy development is also very briliant. 
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skil1" means the room for the division of 1abour and “c1ose1y re1ated" for scope economy. 
Which shape the financia1 industry shou1d be take depends critically on which aspect we must 
emphasis. In the case when we think the scope economy is important， then a concentration of 
finica1 activities into few entities will be desirab1e， that is ， if“c1ose1y related" is emphasized， 
the traditiona1 shape of the banking system will be imaged， where the fund raising and using 
are conducted within the one entity called bank. It 1eads the mixed bank， or in extreme case，the 
universa1 bank. We can expect to enjoy the benefit of the scope economy in this case. 
It is natura1 to say that the introduction of the 10an sa1e market into current system is 
re1ated to the former concept，“different skill" in the sense that the 10an sa1e market is typically 
the p1ace where the fund raiser ，ex.， the mutua1 fund ， the institutiona1 investor like insurance 
company， buys the asset which embodies the c1aims to the釦turecash flow from the fund 
users， for examp1e， the venture capital. This means the division of 1abour between the fund 
raiser and the fund user and enab1es to realize the benefit from the specialization. As the reader 
may notice， the concept of “different skill" is 10cated near the market-oriented system and the 
other near the regu1ation-oriented system. In what follows， we cal this type of 10an sa1e market 
“the positive market". 
(2) The negative market 
As noted above， unfortunate1y in ]apan in 1990's， the 10an sale market is expected to be 
a rescue scheme for the bad 10an prob1em. Nowadays， it is proposed the selling of the bad 10an 
at the market to be off ba1ance， and to boot up the asset va1ue and stock prise. It means 
to detach the unhea1thy assets from the hearth body or to detach the unhealthy banks from 
the who1e system， part1y to protect the business itself and main1y， more importantly， to protect 
the payment system/ credit creation cyc1e. Broad1y speaking， this contributes to improve the 
efficiency so we can a1so call this type “the negative market" or the 10an market in the weak 
sense 2). 
In ]apan， Co-operative Credit Purchasing Company(CCPC) was built in 1993. It aims to 
purchase the bad 10ans from the unhealthy banks and sel them of. But there are few buyers 
currently. On September 1995， the governmenta1 task force proposed the establishment of the 
rea1 asset backed security market. The principa1 purpose of this market is to diversify the risk 
when the great earthquake like Hanshin Daishinsai in 17th ]anuary in 1995 attacks the urban 
area. To diversify the property right， Specia1 Purpose Company (SPC) is established and 
2) Needless to say， this proposal is debatable. First， when the bad performing asets are offered， the excess supp-
ly may result. If so this rescue program does not work. Actually some land site in Tokyo area can not find the 
buyer. Second， to start the program it is also considered to put the oficial funds into the market， that is， topur-
chase the bad aset by the oficial account. Here the oficial funds mean the money creation or the fiscal funds. 
If we follow the strict market discipline the use of oficial funds must be denied. So the actual use the oficial 
funds need a suficient persuasive grounds. 
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it issues the security. Need1ess to say， the strict information disc10sure about the property's 
quality， i.e.， profitabi1ty， the degree of the earthquake resistant and so on， must be required. 
This market suggests us why the asset market can be work as the negative market. The foca1 
point of this market is that the property ho1ders (security ho1ders) are p1ura1 and they are not 
necessary the 1and users 3). By so doing， the asset risk can be diversified. 
In other words， the eva1uation system of the asset quality is minimum required factor for 
operation. Then the task force a1so pointed out that the subjective eva1uation system of the 
degree of the earthquake resistant is required. 
I -2 the information asymmetry of the loan market 
Now we can advance to next stage. Despite positive or negative， the 10an market is ab1e 
to improve the efficiency theoretically (which inc1udes the rescue from the worst situations). 
The above discussion， however， requires the important assumption. The 10an market can be 
contribute the efficiency only if itρω作ctlyworks. This sentence 100ks like a tauto10gy so we 
must exp1ain it in more detail. 
The 10an market is principally a free market. If not so， it is impossib1e to enjoy such the 
benefits listed above. A free entry means by definition “not to forced to enter"， that is， toenter 
or exit is the matter of bank's decision making. On the other hand， to sel their assets at the 
open market inevitab1y means to disc10se their asset quality through the market eva1uation， the 
market price. If the business enterprises inc1uding the bank is parsimonious in this disc10sure 
of their business information， as the resu1ts， the 10an market must face one of the following 
situations. 
(1) On1y the good performing banks enter the 10an market. Such banks dose not need to con-
cea1 the business information， rather they intend to revea1 it. By so doing they cou1d enjoy the 
stock price appreciation and collect the deposit more easi1y. However， on the other hand， such 
banks might not need to sel off their asset immediate1y， un1ess the market overeva1uates their 
asset than seller乍 bookva1ue or some market， especially the stock market， eva1uates the 
bank's financia1 ski1 as the fund user direct1y， not the amount of asset itself 4). If it is natura1 to 
assume that the former case is norma1 case ( =not to sel )， then the 10an market can not be 
established. 
The asset va1uation is the one of the centra1 issues of corporate finance and accounting. 
Thus far severa1 methods have been proposing， for examp1e， net asset va1ue mode1， dividend 
va1uation mode1， earning.va1uation mode1 and so on. They are good neither for one thing nor 
3) This is the analogy of the segmentation of management and ownership. 
4) This rises the additiona1 problem that what the bank's objective variable is. If only the fund using is the main 
purpose of banking， put into diferent1y， to search a prospective projects that have not funded， the bank with 
good asets sel of their asets. By so doing it can appeal his ability. 
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the other， mainly because it is not easy to define perfectly the asset concept without any con-
tradictions to the other items on B/S or the other activities of the firms. Here we confront a 
serious problem， how the loan market solve this problem. In other words， what wil1 be 
evaluated in the loan market? Dose the equi1brium price in the loan market ref1ect the informa-
tion of bank total asset management? 
The loan market can only bid a price of asset offered by banks and it must be a small 
fraction of total asset. Put it into differently， the definition of assets depends critically on the 
bank' s financial strategy. In what follows， for simplification we assume the ful series of asset 
is evaluated in the loan market. Anyway， the success or fai1ure of the loan market hinges on the 
bank's financial strategy. 
(2) No bank enter the loan market then the market can not be stood. As discussed above， if 
al banks have the strong incentives to conceal their information， no asset is offered to the 
market place then the market goes to fai1ure. This is the analogy of the Prisoner's di1emma. If 
one bank disc10ses his asset information through the market and it is not so well， it may lose 
their customers or deposits at the benefit of the other banks. Whether this kind of Nash's 
equi1brium wi1 result or not depends on how the asset manager of each bank anticipates their 
competitive situation under the limited information on the other bank's behaviour. 
(3) A11 banks enter the market. This is the quite contrary case of (2)， that is， the analogy of 
the generation of co-ordination in the sense ofAxelrod. If depositors regard the bank's 
disc10sure through the loan market as a signal that the bank has a reveal-able and high quality 
asset， the non-entered banks will10se their reputations and their current and potential profits. 
In this case， al bank is forced to enter the loan market and keep the appropriate asset value by 
the market forces. 
As the results， only case (3) leads to the well behaved loan market. However， it is the 
most important emphasis that the market establishment depends firstly on the bank' s decision 
making and the customer' s decision making is ref1ected only after the market is established. In 
this sense the working of the loan sale market is the matter of bank's financial strategy. This 
superiority banks can enjoy stems from its dominance to depositors in the information struc-
ture. 
m Loan sale market with the liability market 5 ) 
I -1 deposit inflow and outflow mechanism 
As discussed in the previous section， the loan market has several informational pro-
5) 1n what folows， we use the term “aset" as the loan offered to the market. 1n other words， we assume the 
bank's B/S is veηT simple where the aset is only the loan. 
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blems. However， if the loan market is not available， it's social cost would be serious because we 
could not enjoy thebenefit from the division of labor or specialization of the financial skills. So 
it is necessary to build up the new mechanism which can support the loan market， if possible， 
without any new regulation， i.e.， the re-regulation. For example， the regulating authorities 
could force to banks to enter the loan market and disc10se their loan's market value. But in this 
paper， we propose the other method， by which we can expect to be able to attain the same ef-
fects without any regulation. 
We focus on the interaction between the asset and the liability on B/S， i.e.， the interrela-
tion between the fund raising activity and the fund using activity. Theoretically， the 
liability(asset) in the bank's B/S is backed by their asset (liability). So if the information of the 
asset quality is perfect (= the market evaluation of asset is perfect) and the deposits are 
transferred from one bank to other with no cost， the deposits in the bank whose asset is low 
evaluated in the loan market must flow out and flow into the bank whose asset is highly 
evaluated. As the resu1ts， the good performing banks will face with the deposit inflow and the 
bad performing banks with the deposit outflow. The bad banks will lose the profit oppor-
tunities then they should attempt to restore the market evaluation of their asset by the more 
strict loan screening or redeeming the outstanding loan etc. This gives the upward pressure on 
the asset value. On the other hand， the good banks must cultivate a new investment projects. 
Provided that the marginal efficiency is diminishing， this makes the average asset value 
dec1ine. 
Through the deposit inflow / outflow mechanism， the asset value at the loan market will 
reach the equilibrium. Consequent1y， when the loan market is well functioning the prudential 
behaviour of banks results. 
How can we remove the informational problems under this framework? Remember here 
that the initial decision making to establish the loan market belongs to the bank's fund 
managers， that is， without bank's decision to disc10se their information at the open market， the 
demand will not be met 6). Accordingly， we must transfer the market initiative from the bank' s 
managers to those who need the market evaluation of the bank's asset or information 
disc1osure. Needless to say， the depositors are the first ranked candidate 
6) Note that this is not same to the normal market transaction. In normal microeconomics framework， the inten-
sive demand (the bidding the high price) wil induce the additional supply. Here， the factor the suppliers may 
concern is only the price bided. The perfect information is always assumed. But in the loan market， the sup-
pliers can enjoy the informational dominance. Then despite the high bidding price by the demand side， the sup-
pliers may not react it in the norma1 way. 
7) In other words， depositors must also be self-disciplined. Even if they lose their deposits value， it is not 
covered when the loan market is well functioned. In the case of Kizu credit union， the subsidiary company 
which issued the mortgage security also faHed. The mortgage holders are c1aiming to cover their los because 
the salesmen dose not explain the term of mortgage. But this is non sense! It is holder fault to inquire that. 
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m -2 the liability market 
We must refer the liability market. The liability market is defined as the market where 
the certificates which certify the bank's liability， main1y the deposits in the case of bank， are 
free1y traded (in actua1 the CD has the feature like this. So our discussion might be understood 
as the expanded system of the current CD market). 
Then the depositors bearing the certificate notes can se1 those when they believe their 
bank is under the bad performance. If many depositors behave in same fashion the price of that 
bank's note is depreciated. At the time when the price drops below the face value， a1 
depositors withdraw their deposit and re-deposit in the other bank. It is natural to assume that 
the depositors monitor the market price of notes constant1y and se1 and buy the note to keep 
their own asset value 8 ). 
So not a1 depositors is necessary to engage in actual market trade of certificates. Most 
of them are on1y to monitor the market price and manage their deposit. Put it into different1y， 
this needs some specialized market maker. Fortunately， we can expect the bank itself will do it 
because under this framework the bank must keep his certificate price sufficient1y high to the 
extent that depositors do not withdraw their deposit 9). 
Under which signal dose the depositors make their decision of note trading? By focusing 
the fact that the va1ue of outstanding certificates are principally backed by the bank's financia1 
ski1s for searching， screening and monitoring the prospective investment projects， we can say 
that the price of the bank's loan evaluated in the loan market works as the signaJ10). 
When the depositors can not receive the signal from the loan sale market directly， they 
may regard the bank not priced in the loan market as the bad performing one. Whether the 
bank is actua11y bad or not is not the matter for the depositors. For them， whether the signal 
from the 10an market is observable or not is their concerns. Then， the banks are forced to offer 
the assets to market and this results the prudential behaviour of bank. All is caused by 
depositor's decision to maintain their asset value， not by the bank's decision making. 
Now we must explain why the disc10sure through the loan market is preferable than by 
authorized regulations. To sett1e up the regulation framework it is necessaηto identify the 
kind of the information to be disc10sed lega11y. However， which kind of information the 
depositors need are not deter 
8) Of course the issued bank must repurchase the note at par. 
9) A11 bank may deny the trading the note each other. One bank brings down the other bank's note inten-
tionaly (it is cal1ed the note picking) . But this willlead the competitive note picking then the public trust to the 
system wil be colapsed. So it is not pay for the banks to behave like this. 
10) The modern banking theory refers this function as the informational function of the banking firm. 
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the depositors need must be variable. 
On the other hand， the loan sale market determines the unique price， which is the simple 
signal but ref1ects al factors the market concerns. The advantage of the market price which 
can serve as the signal for every agent is that it is a compound index， which summarizes the in-
numerable individual subjectivity into the one objectivity. Impossible is it any regulating 
authority. 
N The interaction between two markets 
一-some lessons from the free banking theory一一
町一 themarket interaction 
Suming up the above， we can conc1ude that the loan market without liability market must 
fail. In this section， we consider the two market's interaction more in detail. Tell the truth， toin-
quire this issue we must develop the general equi1brium model. However， inwhat follows， by 
discussing the adverse system， i.e.， the liabi1ty market without the loan market， we consider 
verbally the interaction between them. 
The reason why we take such a manner is the liabi1ty market without the loan market is 
not an imaginary one only for the research on the desks. Here we can derive some lessons from 
the experiences in the free banking era. It is the one of points of this paper to re-evaluate the 
meaning of the free banking under this theoretical framework， i.e.， the interaction between the 
asset and liabi1ty market. 
A1though there are many different versions across the nations or periods， the proto-type 
of the free banking can be characterized by the followings. 
(1) Anyone can start the banking business freely and issue their bank note， although they 
must held some reserve asset at the official vault. The depositors can access to the 
desirable note by depositing and withdrawing. 
(2) The outstanding notes can be freely traded in the note market. Their dai1y prices are 
opened. 
According to the traditional discussion， the free issuing system was significantly in-
stable mainly because the bankers were inc1ined to gather up the depository funds by overissu・
ing the note and moved the bank's head office to the far-from county where only the wi1d cat 
could survive. In other words， the existence of the liabi1ity market where the banker could free-
ly sel their note was thought as the main defect. This wild cat hyρothesis has been the long 
lasting powerful explanation to deny the free banking. Actually， the free banking system has 
been replaced by the central banking system from 19 to 20 centuries. 
Why were the wi1d cat bankers able to overissue their note， or why could not the 
depositors aware of it ? By considering the reason for it under our framework， it can be at 
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tributed to the lack of the evaluation mechanism for the bank's asset. Accordingly， the bankers 
fell into the moral hazard trap. When the depositors recognized it， they seceded from the cur-
rency system itself， because they could not keep their asset safely under such a situation. Or 
they hoarded the high quality note or physical asset and used the bad note in the dairy transac-
tion (this is the analogy of Gresham's Law). Because it was difficult for general depositors to 
distinguish the good note from the bad one when the whole system was nearly collapsed， it was 
not strange that the free issuing system was abandoned. 
Provided that the asset evaluation mechanism works， the depositors can select the high 
quality note. Then the bad note is removed by market forces， i.e.， the adverse Gresham's Law 
works. On the other hand， the bank which dose not enter the loan market is labelled as the bad 
performing bank then his note is depreciated and flow back. 
So we can conc1ude the reason why the historical free banking system's failure is not 
because of the existence of the note market (Iiability market) but because of the lack of the 
asset valuation mechanism which leads the bankers to the prudential behaviour and depositors 
to select the high quality note. This supports the stability of the whole monetary system11). In 
short， in our imaginary economy， the note market which is based on the free issuing and the 
free exchange system (deposit inflow / outflow mechanism) contributes to prevent the banks 
from the moral hazard and provides the prudential asset management in co-operation with the 
loan market. 
11) The criticism to a free issuing gives the ground for the introducing the centra1 bank system. However， if our 
discussion is correct， the central bank system is not only the desirable system. The function of central bank are 
(1) to issue the central bank note monopolistica1y， (2) to maintain the reserve. In our view， (1) relates to the supp-
ly of medium of exchange and (2) to the determination of the unit of account. Private banks reserve a part of 
their fund into central bank， then the central bank evaluate it like $ 1000 or 1: 2000 and so on. This means the cen-
tral bank is determining the unit of account. By accepting the unit， the private bank can operate their 
loan/deposit business. Theoretically speaking， this relates to the War1usian numeraire. In the simu1taneous 
equation system where the demand/ supply conditions and prices for n goods are determined， the system is in-
deterministic without numeraire. If n banks issue n types of bank notes， this constitutes the n demand = supply 
simu1taneous equations system. Then one of the notes must be chosen as a numeraire. The reserve system is 
working as a numeraire， by giving the accounting unit($， 1: etc.) to private banks. Without the unit of account 
any trade is impossible， however， once the unit is selected， a private issuing is quite possible. That means the 
centra1 bank must set the unit of account， however， this dose not mean it must issue the central bank note 
monopolistically.Under such an economy， the central bank works as only the reserve va叫t.Then ， when the 
transaction cost's structure changes drastically， which is not unrealistic under the high speed development of 
the computational technique， the public preference to the monopolist bank may change. As the results， the note 
a部sthe nu日lUme町r悶.ヨ泊a
rate between the notes. Provided that the loan market which serves the eva1uating mechanism of bank's asset， 
the note issued by the bad performing bank is not demanded and only the high quality notes can survive. Of 
course， the market mechanism leads eventually the situation where al notes are equally evaluated. Some 
writers are discussing that this eventual situation is substantia11y same as the one note economy， iι， the 
monopolistic issuing by the centra1 bank. But we must distinguish between the monopoly as the result and as 
the way. More detai1 discussions are given in Fukaura (1995). 
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Medium of exchange is defined as the good that the accompanied transaction cost to use 
it for exchange is minimum(Fukaura(I995)) . To be ‘minimum' leads the single money 
economy. Then， the process that the payment system is established equals substantially to the 
process to search the medium of exchange with minimum transaction cost under the given tran-
saction structure. By following this， multi-note system， which is the main future of free issuing 
system， can be considered as a transition period to single note economy. Here we must con-
front following theoretical problem. In single note economy， it is possible to distinguish bet-
ween money and non-money because the ‘minimum transaction cost' condition identifies the 









































































































 multi notes economy 
By lining up al goods along the transaction cost， we.can easi1y identify the minimum tran-
saction cost note. However， inmulti notes economy， what is the substantial difference between 
maximum transaction note (Nn) and minimum transaction cost non-money (G 1) ? Ifthe quan-
titative difference of transaction cost between them are small， why dose the public chose Nn as 
the money， not G 1 ? Further， if people prefer Nn-1 than Nn， then Nn-2 is more preferable and 
Nn-3 is same. As the resu1ts， multi note economy converges to the single note economy. Saying 
different1y， it is not so important whether the economy is under the single note system or multi 
note system because the former can be the corner solution of the latter. Rather， it is the border 
line between money and non-money that is significant to understand our monetary system 12). 
12) Note that this validity of single money economy depends criticaly on the assumption that the transaction cost 
structure is stable. If the transaction structure changes by， for example， the telecommunication technical 
development， single money dose not necessary survive further as the medium of exchange. In this point se also 
Fukaura(I995) . 
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町一 2 miscellaneous problems 
We must app1y above discussions， which is the theoretical appraisa1 to the free banking， 
to the current issues. Beside the centra1 bank problem (see footnote 11) ，we must consider the 
following points. 
(1) note dealing: 
Is it actually possible for depositors to exchange their holding note sufficient1y often to 
keep their asset va1ue like a foreign exchange dealer? It is difficu1t to answer this because it is 
an exceedingly practica1 problems. However， by referring the historical records we can make 
some predictions on it. In free banking era in U .S.A.， dai1y report of the exchange rate between 
al notes was published on the newspaper and very avai1able for citizens. People read the report 
and exchanged their holding note. It is impossible to apply this experience to the current 
economy， however， if we observe the flourish of the foreign exchange market we cou1d expect 
the similar situation on the free issued bank note13). 
(2) no deposit people: 
Imagine those who receives al his salary by cash and hold it as it is. Even in this case， 
the employer must have the deposit account and he must be careful in keeping their deposit 
va1ue. So it is probab1e that the worker can receive the most va1uab1e note when his boss is ra-
tional. 
But what if his boss pays the worker by the bad note and keeps the good note to himself ? 
This is the adverse Gresham's Law. In this case， the worker suffers the 10ss. So it is necessary 
to give the worker the right to receive the best note. It requires the specia11aw but it's not an in-
tervention but a keeping the market transparency. 
(3) speculation: 
Needless to say， it is quite natural that the speculative action will occur in the note 
market. But we must notice the profit seeking activity contributes to stabilize the price 1evel， 
because for raising the arbitrage profit the speculators must buy (demand) when the price is 
10w and sel (supp1y) when the price is high. In this sense， inthe process to converge one domi-
nant note the specu1ation is very important. And when the public confidence to the dominant 
note changes， again the specu1ation 1eads to the new equi1brium， that is， a se1ection of new 
dominant note (see footnote 12) . Generally speaking， inthe free market the specu1ation is an 
inevitab1e factor. When it is regarded as the destabilizing factor， some conditions for the 
13) It is natural to think that the special dealer of note will emerged. It may be the bank itself the depositors 
deposit. Accordingly， we must account the aditional transaction cost. 
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perfect competition must be violated. 
(4) deposit insurance: 
In the system discussed above， the depositors must control their deposit value by careful・
ly observing the note market. In the discussions of free banking， especially the wi1d cat bank-
ing hypothesis， itwas said that the depositors suffered the heavy damage by the wi1d cat 
banker's action. As the resu1ts， the protection of depositors were required partly in the point of 
view of the national welfare and part1y of the stabi1ty of monetary system. 
The S&L case， where many S&L fai1ed like a line of dominoes， is fresh in our memory. 
After the case the deposit insurance scheme in U.S.A. was completely restructured and this is 
the symbolic event which shows the dominance of the deposit insurance as the deposit protec-
tion method. 
Here it must be distinguished between the protection of depositors'ρropeめIand the 
macroeomonomic lunction 01 deposit itself. The former means the protection of depositors' per-
sonal property and the latter means of the function of payment system through the deposit and 
it is significant1y related to the economic infrastructure so there is a room to intervene official-
ly. In other words， the property of outsiders who have c1aims to the deposit in the unhealthy 
bank must be secured but the depositors' itself properties must not. In the following figure， 
depositors' claim shown by dashed line and outsiders' c1aim shown by solid line must be treated 
separately under the deposit protection scheme. For example， the issued checks by depositors 
are to rescued by limited time. According to circumstance， the introducing the official funds 
may be rationalised14). If depositors intentiona11y withdraw their deposit before the maturity 
date， it must be legally secured to chase it. When without intentional withdrawing， the issued 
checks must be liquidate by the upper limit of the ba1ance15). It is often said that depositors 
must be saved but not troubled institutions. However， readers can understand why this is not 
correct. Depositors are insider and they must be訂 heavyresponsibi1ty for the deposit value. 
Anyway， ifthe authorized action is not for depositors' property protection but for the 
c1aims to the deposit， it can be regarded as the method for keeping the payment system stable. 
14) On Sep. 1995， the interium report compi1ed by a committee of Financial System Research Counci1 suggested 
the injection of taxpayer's money is decided oficialy. This means the taxpayer's money is the 1ast resort in 
debt crisis. 
15) Of course we must consider the redeeming priority of issued checks. It is also possib1e that insider and out-
sider conspire and move the transaction account to the troubled bank and get the oficial fund. 
unhealthy bank dissolve 
deposit 
bridge bank protectionable 
:...--_ _  ---lr outsiders 1 
claims l j 
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To protect the outsider's c1aim， the bridge bank may be necessary. In Japan， such a 
bank was established， however， itwas not followed a systematic rescue program but also ad 
hoc policy reaction16). We also never say no rescue programs are required， rather it is 
necessary. However， it must be the program which supports the market mechanism or market 
discipline and not be substitute it17). 
(5) market discipline and the association-type banks: 
Fol1owing the market discipline means the acceptance the profit maximization principle 
as the first management principle. For most commercial bank， this is quiet1y plain. But some 
association-type banks， for example， credit union， dose not necessary follow this principle 
because the purpose is the mutual aid between members. However J apanese experience shows 
c1ear1y such a purpose is an only illusion and leads the huge moral hazard of union managers. 
Accordingly， in the medium or log run， we believe it is desirable that the association-type 
banks wil1 be converted to the commercial banks. 
16) The bridge bank is the entity that takes over the failed bank business and al its aset. It evaluates the fai1ed 
bank value and decides whether it must be survived or dissolved. However， the evaluation mechanism is a1so re-
quired. 
17) Who must shou1der the costs for the bridge bank is controversia1 problem. What is indeed the public fund? 
Generally speaking， the fiscal fund and new money creation are the candidates. However， we believe the later 
is preferable. That is， the bridge bank have the liabi1ty to the central bank. By so doing， the oficial fund may be 
recovered when the bridge bank performs wel. The assets held by the bridge bank funded by the oficial fund 
are the nation's properties. This means the National Diet can make the decision making for disposal of that 
assets. In the case of U.S.A.， these procedures led the good resu1ts. 
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V Decentralization and loan sale market 
If anything， the above five topics are referring the technical aspects accompanied in the 
loan market， which may be difficu1t to solve. However， insome extent， we can treat those by 
the legal measures. Of course it must be noted that measures must be consistent to the market 
principle or discipline. 
More important and substantial point we must consider is how we can explain the loan 
market under the current torrent of the financial deregulation. 
As noted in first section， the most distinguished factor of the loan market is related to 
the division of labour in the field of the financial intermediation， in short， unbundling， which 
means the segmentation between the fund raising and using. The current system is needless to 
say a bundling system in the sense that the banking firms are the most inf1uential financial in-
termediary . 
However， unbundling dose not mean only the segmentation of the skil. It has the poten-
tial to lead the resource reallocation or reshuff1e of allocation. If the unbundling is advances， 
the agent which has the one specialized skil can enter the financial business. For example， the 
investment advising company， which nowadays the mere assistant company， can loan to the 
prospect project and then sel off the c1aims at the loan market. In this case， it plays an impor-
tant role as the specialized fund user18). In japan， the city banks (money centre bank in U.S.A. 
sense) maintain the nation wide branch network， through which they can collect a large 
amount of deposit. On the other hand， the Industrial Bank of j apan (investment bank in the 
European sense) is prohibited to supply normal saving account. Instead it can issue the deben-
ture to raise the fund. However， it's fund raising function is limited. Actually， the Ministry of 
Finance which can use the postal saving fund is the main customer. The fund f10w from com-
mercial banks to IBj is not wide19). 
However， this debenture system is considered as the primitive loan sale market or the 
asset evaluating mechanism. As the facts， the screening skill of IBj is highly evaluated and 
through the high growth era other commercial banks lent willingly the firms which borrowed 
from IBj20). 
18) In real， such a firm must borrow the fund from the bank. However， it can sel of the c1aims to the projects and 
repay its own borrowing. 
19) The debenture market is partly functioning as the fund f10w mechanism. But it is regarded as one kind of the 
time deposit. Or， it is the main fund using field of the postal saving. The postal saving is servicing by the 
Ministry of Post & Telecommunication but the using the funds are directed by the ministry of Finance. 
Anyway， the current fund f10w through the debenture dose not function as the loan evaluation mechanism. 
20) For example， When Kawasaki Group planned to enter the stel industry， Bank of Japan tried to stop that plan 
from the view point of national welfare and industrial order. Only JIB supported Kawasaki. We know now that 
I]B's decision is right. The epoch making merger between Yahata Steel and Nihon Steel and between Nissan 
Motors and Prince Motors were initiated by IJB. The public opinion was against it. 
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Intuitively speaking， we may define the loan market as the expanded market of current 
debenture market. If the loan market is perfect1y an open market which means any economic 
agent can enter there and trade c1aims， even the financial intermediaries can sel their asset in 
the market and can diversify the total risk if they have sufficient fund using skil1. Accordingly， 
the loan market leads the inter-industry resource reallocation. That is， the agents which have 
superior financial ski1 but can not engage in the financial activities under the current 
framework can realize their potential talents. 
We are sure that the loan market accelerates the financial deregulation by initiative of 
the private sector and the economy wideresource re-allocation beyond the financial industry. 
Recently， it is discussed that present Japanese economic framework can be originated up to 
1940's when the strict regulation oriented system was completed to pursue the Pacific War. 
After the political defeat in 1945， the basic regulation framework survived and provided the fun-
damental conditions for recovery. If we accept this view， it would be required to consider the re-
cent movement of deregulation or restructuring in the historical view. We may now confront 
with the historical resource allocation or reshuffling of old fashioned system which was built 50 
years ago. 
¥I Concluding remarks 
The loan sale market in Japan is sti1 in infant stage. The sad reality is the loan market is 
considered as the special market for the bad performing loan. We believe that it is not desirable 
that the policy authority is content with this situation， because it spoi1s the substantial function 
of the loan market， i.e.， the positive market. Further， under the financial distress like in Japan， 
without the bank asset evaluation mechanism， the authority is like betraying depositors by let-
ting banks overestimate the asset value. 
The bad loan problems in Japan are not only the problems of the banking system itself. 
We must consider them as the problem of overall economic structure whose foundation was 
constructed 50 years ago. Accordingly， it is important for us to understand the loan market in 
the context that the economy-wide deregulation. 
The perfect deregulation in the field of money and banking contains the liberalization of 
bank note issuing. Logically discussing， the loan market is c10sely related to the free issuing 
system. In this sense， we can derive some lessons from the free banking era， which is the impor-
tant theoretical findings of this paper. Needless to say， an introduction of free issuing system in-
to the actual economy is dificult. But this dose not mean the above discussions are mean-
ingless. Rather， by establishing the loan market， we must firmly recognize that we are just on 
the direct way from the regulation oriented economy to the market oriented economy and there 
is no way to turn back21). Many J apanese are sti1 reluctant to compete with each other and the 
monetary authorities are reluctant to abandon the existing regulations. Now Japanese economy 
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stands at a cross-roads on whether it can achieve the mature economic structure in the true 
sense. 
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